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S E C R E T CAIRO 7171

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING WITH SADAT AND EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS

REF: CAIRO 7122

1. AS ARRANGED LAST NIGHT, I MET WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT AT 2030 THIS EVENING. VENUE WAS AT THE
PYRAMIDS REST HOUSE, WHERE THE PRESIDENT HAD SPENT MOST
OF THE DAY GETTING READY FOR HIS JULY 22 SPEECH AND,
AS HE PUT IT TO ME, REFLECTING ON THE LATEST ISRAELI
PROPOSAL. ALSO PRESENT WERE VP MOBAREK, PRIMIN
MAMDUH SALEM, FAHMY AND GAMASY. SUMMARY OF MY HOUR
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AND ONE-HALF LONG MEETING, WHICH INCLUDED RECEIVING
AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL AND A SECOND, FALLBACK PROPOSAL,
IS REPORTED BELOW.

2. SADAT FIRST NOTED THAT, UPON CHECKING, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE IS NOT RPT NOT OUTSIDE EITHER THE MITLA OR GIDI PASSES. THE EGYPTIANS HAD TRANSPOSED THE LINES AS DRAWN ON THE ISRAELI MAP TO AN EGYPTIAN MAP OF THE SAME SCALE. WHEN THEY DID SO, THEY FOUND THAT THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE IS BETWEEN TWO AND ONE-HALF AND THREE KILOMETERS INSIDE THE EASTERN ENTRANCES OF THE TWO PASSES. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI MAIN FORCE LINE IS INDEED ABOUT 350 METERS OUTSIDE OF THE EASTERN ENTRANCES OF THE PASSES. GAMASY SHOWED ME THE EGYPTIAN PLOTTED LINE PURPORTING TO DEMONSTRATE THIS. I AGAIN WENT THROUGH MY EXPLANATION OF LAST NIGHT BASED ON STATE 170879 IN THE CASE OF GIDI AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE TO PARKER'S MEMORIAL IN THE CASE OF MITLA. GAMASY STATED THAT THEY CANNOT IDENTIFY THE 750 METER MARK MENTIONED BY THE ISRAELIS. HE CLAIMED IT IS NOT ON ANY EGYPTIAN MAPS. NOR DID HE HAVE ANY IDEA WHERE THE PARKER MEMORIAL WAS. ANYONE CAN SEE, GAMASY ASSERTED, WHERE THE DEFILES BEGIN. THESE ARE THE PASS ENTRANCES. SADAT OPINED THAT THIS WAS DELIBERATE ISRAELI DECEPTION, BUT ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION.

3. EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL: SADAT THEN RECALLED THE OBJECTIONS HE HAD EXPRESSED LAST NIGHT TO THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL AND AFFIRMED THAT AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL HAD BEEN PREPARED. HE INSTRUCTED GAMASY TO GIVE ME A MAP DEPICTING THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL AND TO EXPLAIN IT. THIS GAMASY DID WITH FREQUENT INTERVENTIONS BY SADAT, MOBAREK AND FAHMY. FAHMY MADE THE POINT THAT IT WAS DRAWN UP IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, AS WE HAD SUGGESTED. THE ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL FOLLOW:

A) THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE IS SO DRAWN THAT IT IS CLEARLY OUT OF THE EASTERN ENTRANCE OF THE GIDI
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AND MITLA PASSES WITH THE MAIN FORCE LINE SLIGHTLY TO THE EAST OF IT. SADAT NOTED THAT IF THE ISRAELI INTENTION IS INDEED TO HAVE THEIR FORWARD LINE JUST OUTSIDE OF THE EASTERN ENTRANCES OF THE PASSES AND THE ISSUE HAD SIMPLY BECOME CONFUSED BECAUSE OF THE PLOTTING OF LINES ON THE MAP, THEN THERE WAS NO PROBLEM ON THIS POINT. GAMASY OBSERVED THAT FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY FORCES FROM THEIR FORWARD LINE AS REDRAWN BY THE EGYPTIANS TO THE EASTERN ENTRANCES OF THE PASSES WITHIN A MATTER OF A FEW MINUTES. THUS, HE CONTENTED, THE ISRAELIS ARE IN NO WAY MILITARILY DISADVANTAGED BY LOCATING THEIR FORWARD LINE JUST

OUTSIDE THE EASTERN ENTRANCE.

B) THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EXTENSIONS OF THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE ARE REDRAWN TO CORRESPOND WITH THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL OF LAST MONTH, I.E. THE "BLUE LINE". GAMASY HAD AND GAVE ME AN OVERLAY FROM THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL OF JUNE, 1975 FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL MAP. IT DEMONSTRATES THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PASSES SALIENT, THE EGYPTIANS SIMPLY TOOK THE EARLIER ISRAELI FORWARD LINE AND INCORPORATED IT INTO THEIR NEW COUNTERPROPOSAL. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE ISRAELI MAIN FORCE LINE.

C) IN THE ACCESS CORRIDOR AREA, THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL IS THE SAME AS THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS: FIRST, THE HAMAM FARAUN AREA IS ALREADY HATCHED IN AS UNDER EGYTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. SECOND, IN THE CASE OF THE TWO CONTROVERSIAL SECTIONS OF ROAD, THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL SKETCHES IN TWO ALTERNATE INLAND TRACKS WHICH CAN BE USED FOR WHEELED VEHICLES AND JEEPS. AS I HAD SUSPECTED WOULD BE THE CASE, THE TWO PROPOSED ALTERNATE ROADS/TRACKS RUN PRETTY FAR INLAND IN LARGE ARCS. GAMASY STATED HE KNOWS THE AREA WELL AND HAS HIMSELF DRIVEN ON THESE TRACKS. SADAT OBSERVED THAT HE IS SURE THE ISRAELIS ALREADY KNOW ABOUT THESE TRACKS. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE SERIOUS
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ABOUT BEING WILLING TO MOVE THEIR ROAD INLAND, IF SUITABLE LOCATIONS CAN BE FOUND, SADAT CONTENDED THE PROPOSED ALTERNATE ROADS SHOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE.

D) ALL RPT ALL OF THE SIX PROPOSED US MILITARY POSTS IN THE GIDI AND MITLA PASS AREA ARE ELIMINATED. QUOTING A PHRASE HE SAID HE LEARNED FROM PRESIDENT FORD, SADAT CLAIMED SUCH US MILITARY POSTS ON EGYPTIAN SOIL ARE "NOT SALEABLE" TO HIS OWN PEOPLE, THE ARABS OR THE SOVIETS. HE WOULD BE CHARGED WITH HAVING EXPELLED SOVIET MILITARY EXPERTS IN ORDER TO BRING IN AMERICANS. HE SUSPECTED THERE WOULD ALSO BE CONGRESSIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION IN TRYING TO PUT FORTH SUCH AN IDEA.

E) WITH REPSECT TO THE ISRAELI MONITORING STATION AT JEBAL UMM KHUSHAIB, THIS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE UNDER US ADMINISTRATION WITH ISRAELI TECHNICAL MANNING, INSTEAD, AS HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT FORD, THE STATION SHOULD BE MANNED BY AMERICAN CIVILIANS. I AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT WE LACK THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE STATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. SADAT RESPONDED

THAT IT SHOULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN 50 OR 60 PEOPLE AND CONTENDED WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND THAT NUMBER. HE ASKED THAT WE TRY TO DO SO. THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE IN THE STATION. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT AGREE TO AMERICAN MANNING, THE STATION SHOULD BE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID NOT RPT NOT SPELL OUT EXACTLY WHAT HE MEANT AND I THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO ENCOURAGE THIS IDEA BY ASKING FOR ELABORATION.

F) A SIMILAR EGYPTIAN MONITORING STATION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT JEBAL HAITAN JUST SOUTH OF MITLA PASS. THIS, TOO, SHOULD BE MANNED BY AMERICAN CIVILIANS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, COME UNDER THE UN.

G) THE PROPOSED MONITORING INSTALLATION AT HAMAN FARAUN SHOULD ALSO BE MANNED BY AMERICANS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, COME UNDER THE UN.

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H) IN ADDITION, TWO EGYPTIAN WARNING STATIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE BUFFER ZONE. ONE WOULD BE AT ROMANA LOCATED WHERE THE COASTAL ROAD ENTERS THE UNEF BUFFER ZONE FROM THE WEST AND THE SECOND WOULD BE ABOUT MIDWAY ON THE ISMAILIA ROAD AS IT PASSES THROUGH THE BUFFER ZONE. THESE WARNING STATIONS, GAMASY EXPLAINED, WOULD HAVE SMALL PERSONNEL COMPLEMENTS AND BE EQUIPED WITH WIRELESS SETS. THEIR MISSION WOULD BE TO GIVE WARNING OF POSSIBLE ISRAELI AIR OR GROUND ATTACKS. SHOULD THE ISRAELIS PROVE TO BE ADAMANT ABOUT THE JEBAL UMM KHUSHAIB STATION, SADAT STATED THE EGYPTIANS DO NOT IN THAT CASE WANT THE JEBAL HAITAN MONITORING STATION, BUT DO RPT DO WANT THE TWO WARNING STATIONS ALONG THE COASTAL AND ISMAILIA ROADS. THESE WARNING STATIONS WOULD BE UNDER THE UN.

I) TWO EGYPTIAN COMPANY SIZE POSTS SHOULD BE IN THE UNEF BUFFER ZONE ASTRIDE THE ROAD LEADING TO THE MITLA PASS. NO RPT NO SUCH COMPANY STRENGTH POSTS ARE WANTED IN THE WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE GIDI PASS. WHEN I ASKED WHY TWO SUCH POSTS ON THE MITLA APPROACHES, GAMASY FIRST CONTENDED THE EARLIER ISRAELI PROPOSAL HAD OFFERED THIS. I RECALLED THE EARLIER ISRAELI PROPOSAL HAD SHOWN ONE SUCH POST AT THE WESTERN END OF EACH OF THE TWO PASSES. SADAT INTERVENED TO SAY IT IS IMMATERIAL TO HIM WHETHER THERE ARE ONE OR TWO POSTS, BUT THEY SHOULD BE AT MITLA, NOT GIDI.

J) FINALLY, THE EGYPTIAN FORWARD LINE IS

MOVED EASTWARD BY BETWEEN 4 AND 6 KILOMETERS FROM THE PRESENT UNEF LINE. THE PURPOSE HERE, GAMASY EXPLAINED, IS TO KEEP THE EGYPTIAN TROOPS 30 KILOMETERS OR SO EAST OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO SECURE THE CANAL CITIES AND THE CANAL ITSELF. IT IS IN FACT 30 KILOMETERS FROM THE CANAL IN THE NORTH AND 25 KILOMETERS IN THE SUEZ AREA. THIS WOULD BE AN AREA OF LIMITED ARMAMENTS AND THINNED OUT FORCES. UNEF WOULD RETAIN THE LATERAL ROAD IN THAT SECTOR.

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4. EGYPTIAN FALLBACK PROPOSAL: AFTER WE HAD GONE OVER THE MAP AND GAMASY'S EXPLANATION, SADAT SUDDENLY INTRODUCED A SECOND, FALLBACK PROPOSAL AS OF POSSIBLE HELP TO YOU. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT THE JEBAL UMM KHUSHAIB STATION AND THEIR FORWARD LINE AT THE EASTERN ENTRANCE OF THE PASSES AND ARE UNWILLING TO GO BACK TO THE FORMER BLUE LINE IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WHICH THEY PROPOSED LAST MONTH, THE PRESIDENT, WOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL, BUT WITH THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS:

A) IN THE AREA OF THE TWO CONTROVERSIAL STRETCHES OF ROAD ALON THE GULF OF SUEZ, THE ISRAELIS MUST MOVE THE ROAD INLAND TO THE ALREADY SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE TRACKS.

B) THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO AMERICAN MILITARY POSTS IN THE PASS AREAS FOR THE REASON ALREADY INDICATED.

C) IN PLACE OF THE PROPOSED EGYPTIAN MONITORING STATION AT JEBAL HAITRAN, THE TWO ALREADY MENTIONED EGYPTIAN WARNING STATIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON THE COAST AND ISMAILIA ROADS.

D) THE EGYPTIAN MAIN FORCES LINE SHOULD MOVE FROM ITS PRESENT LOCATION WEST OF THE CANAL, TO THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN FORWARD LINE IN SINAI, I.E. EAST OF THE CANAL. THE EGYPTIAN FORWARD LINE SHOULD BE MOVED TO THE PRESENT UN LINE.

5. SADAT PROVIDED NO RPT NO MAP FOR THIS FALLBACK PROPOSAL, BUT IT IS NO PROBLEM PLOTTING IT FROM THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL AND THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL MAPS.

6. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY SEND YOU AN ACCOUNT OF OUR TALK AND WOULD ALSO ARRANGE TO SEND THE EGYPTIAN MAP AND OVERLAY TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW BY SPECIAL COURIER. YOU WOULD HAVE IT BY

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TOMORROW NIGHT.

7. COMMENT: SADAT'S COUNTER AND FALLBACK PROPOSALS, WHILE THEY ARE MORE THAN THE ISRAELIS HAVE THUS FAR BEEN WILLING TO GIVE, SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY THAN HAVE ANY OF HIS PAST IDEAS. HE SUDDENLY SEEMS ANXIOUS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT SO LONG AS IT GIVES HIM SOMETHING TO WHICH HE CAN POINT AS A SUCCESS AND WHICH SATISFIES THE HONOR OF THE MILITARY. FROM HIS SEVERAL INTERJECTIONS I GAINED THE IMPRESSION HE IS CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS ARE OUT PERSONALLY TO HUMILIATE HIM BY THEIR MISERLY TERMS. THERE IS A POINT BEYOND WHICH HE WILL NOT GO IN HUMBLING HIMSELF, BUT AFTER THIS EVENING'S SESSION IT IS HARD TO SAY JUST WHERE THAT POINT IS. HE LOOKS TO US, ALMOST DESPERATELY AND WITH A CERTAIN SENSE OF RUEFUL DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR INABILITY THUS FAR TO EXTRACT MORE FROM THE ISRAELIS, TO HELP HIM REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH HE CAN DEFEND BEFORE HIS PEOPLE AND THE ARAB WORLD AND WHICH WILL NOT EARN HIM BRICKBATS FROM HIS CRITICS AT HOME AND ABROAD. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THE EGYPTIAN STRATEGISTS SEEM LESS CONCERNED ABOUT SECURING THEMSELVES IN THE MITLA AND GIDA PASS AREAS, BUT ARE SUDDENLY MAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT AN ISRAELI ATTACK ALONG THE COASTAL AND ISMAILIA RAOD AXES AS EVIDENCED BY THE GREAT IMPORTANCE SADAT ATTACHES TO THE TWO WARNING STATION. EILTS

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